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PARTIES,
All parties to this action are listed in the caption, above. Of those parties, only

Tooele City and Tooele Associates, LP, are parties to this appeal.
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IV.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j), this Court has jurisdiction to review the

trial court's June 3, 2010 decision, striking the jury verdict and ordering a new trial.
V.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court acted within its discretion in

striking the jury verdict and ordering a new trial, either because the jury's special verdicts
were irreconcilably inconsistent or on some alternative ground. (R. 24264-309.)
The applicable standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard. Tooele
Associates, L.P. ("TA") asserts that "no Utah appellate court appears to have directly
addressed the standard of review to be employed." (TA'sBrf. 1.) TA is wrong.
Rasmussen v. Sharapta, 895 P.2d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), holds that the abuse of
discretion standard applies to the review of a trial court's disposition of a motion for a
new trial predicated on inconsistency in the jury's special verdict. Id. at 396-97.
The application of the abuse of discretion standard also is supported by case law
construing Utah R. Civ. P. 59. The trial court's June 3, 2010 mistrial decision was an «
application of Rule 59(d), and "[u]nder our Rule 59, it is well settled that, as a general
matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for new trial."
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 803-05 (Utah 1991). This standard of review
applies to mistrial decisions because
the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses and had a first-hand view of
all of the evidence, and the proceedings throughout the trial and has ruled
on the admissibility of the evidence, and instructed the jury on the law
governing their verdict, and had opportunity of observing the tactics of the
counsel throughout the trial and jury's reaction thereto. . . .
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Wellman v. Noble. 366 P.2d 701, 704 (Utah 1961); Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App
379,TJ14, 173 P.3d865.
A first-hand view of trial proceedings is important in deciding whether
inconsistent jury verdicts can be reconciled. "The district judge, who has observed the
jury during the trial, prepared the special verdict questions and explained them to the
jury, is in the best position to determine whether the answers reflect confusion or
uncertainty.'" Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Hauserv.Kubalak. 929 F.2d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1991)); Bonin v. Tour West Inc., 896
F.2d 1260, 1261 (10th Cir. 1990); Richard v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 853 F.2d
1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1988); Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co. v. Int'l Engraving Co., 528
F.2d 1272, 1276 (1 st Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976). TA itself argues that
"harmonizing a jury verdict [requires] consideration of] the verdict from the jury's
perspective - requiring the court to consider the jury verdict form and the 'case as
submitted' to the jury, including jury instructions and the evidence and arguments
presented at trial." (TA's Brf. 44 (emphasis in original).) Because the trial court is in the
best position to consider the case "from the jury's perspective," the abuse of discretion
standard applies.
VI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition In Court
Below.

This is a complex case regarding a real estate development project in Tooele City,
known as Overlake. The course of proceedings was dominated by extensive motion

2
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practice by the City to limit TA's expansive breach of the Development Agreement
claims.
TA initiated this case on June 5, 2002, alleging that the City breached the
Development Agreement with respect to the City's expenditures of park and recreation
impact fees outside of Overlake. (R. 1, 23-24.) On September 22, 2004, the trial court
granted the City's Rule 56 motion and dismissed with prejudice TA's only breach of the
Development Agreement claim.1 (R. 2311.)
A month later, on October 20, 2004, TA sought leave to file a First Amended
Complaint, accusing the City of numerous breaches of the Development Agreement. (R.
2364-67, 2369-74.) The City opposed TA's First Amended Complaint, first, with an
opposition to TA's motion to amend that demonstrated the legal futility of many of TA's
breach allegations. (R. 3582, 3584-97.) Thereafter, the City succeeded in limiting and
narrowing TA's breach claims through summary judgment motions. (R. 10743, 10756,
18898, 20836, Tooele Assocs., L.P. v. Tooele City, 2011 UT App 36, 675 Utah Adv.
Rep. 22.) The City's success is evident from the reduction in TA's alleged damages,
which went from "in excess of $67 million" (which meant about $200 million, according
to TA's Rule 26(a)(1)(c) initial damages disclosure2) to between $4,764,511.40 and

1

The judge who made that ruling and every other ruling of a dispositive nature in
this case was Judge Randall N. Skancky. Judge Skanchy has presided over this case for
eight of its nine years. In fact, the case followed Judge Skanchy in 2006 from his bench
in Tooele County to his courtroom in Salt Lake County. (R. at 6886-87.)
2

R. at 3924,3943-44.
3
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$6,700,124.40, according to TA's alleged damages statement in the June 11, 2009 PreTrial Order.3 (R. 3829, 21910-12.)
In one of the City's Rule 56 motions, the City advanced its position that TA's
failure to complete public improvements in Overlake, i.e., streets, sidewalks, curb and
gutter, etc., allowed the City to deny new phase or plat requests. (R. 11516-17.) The
City has always claimed that TA's failure to complete the public improvements was a
legal basis on which it could deny new plat requests, and the City has always identified
the Bond Agreements as grounds for such legal basis.4 (R. 4516, 21856.)
TA incredibly asserts that "[i]t was not until after trial" when the City advanced
the Bond Agreements as support for its position that TA's public improvement
deficiencies allowed the City to deny new plats. (TA's Brf. 15, 29 n.25.) TA's assertion
is categorically false. The City advanced the Bond Agreements as grounds to deny new
phases in its answers to TA's first and second amended complaints and in the June 11,
2009 Pre-Trial Order. (R. 4516, 13520, 21856, 21915.)
The City's Bond Agreement position was also the subject of extensive Rule 56
motion practice, the outcome of which set the stage for the trial. On December 12, 2007,
3

The Pre-Trial Order was actually finalized and adopted by the parties and the
trial court in the middle of trial, on the same day TA rested its case-in-chief. (R. at
21921-22,21925.)
4

According to TA, "the City claimed that the Development Agreement was to
receive the 'death penalty.'" (TA's Brf. 15.) The City never used such a hyperbolic
phrase as "death penalty." The City simply claimed, in accordance with plain Bond
Agreement terms to which TA voluntarily assented, that TA's failure to complete public
improvements in conformance with TA's own construction plans allowed the City to
deny new subdivision phases.
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the City filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Denial of New Phases
Due to Incomplete Public Improvements, in which the City asserted that there was no
genuine dispute that TA's public improvements were incomplete, and, as a matter of law,
such non-completion allowed the City to invoke the Bond Agreements to deny TA's new
plat requests. (R. 11516-17, 11525-26, 11541.) In its opposition, TA contended that the
improvements were, in fact, complete, and even if the improvements were incomplete,
TA argued, such non-completion provided no legal basis to deny new phases. (R. 12861,
12870, 12913-14, 12925-26, 12932-33.)
In an August 13,2008 Memorandum Decision and Order, the trial court held that
there were material fact disputes concerning whether the City waived its rights to claim,
or should be estopped from claiming, that TA failed to complete the public
improvements. (R. 14362.) The trial court did, however, conclude, as a matter of law,
that "the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny further phases
based upon incomplete public improvements." (R. 14351.) That legal conclusion
became the law of the case, which would become an important part of the City's trial
strategy.
Also setting the trial stage was the Pre-Trial Order. On January 15, 2009, the trial
court directed the parties to prepare a pre-trial order. (R. 18778; 22694, pp. 57-58.)
Therein, the City was careful to preserve its position that the Bond Agreements entitled
the City to deny TA's new phase requests. (R. 21856.)
In addition, the City fought to ensure that the legal rulings that it previously won
would not be lost in trial proceedings and that TA could not shift its alleged damages
5
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calculations. During an April 9, 2009 pre-trial conference, the City persuaded the trial
court, over TA's objections, to allow the inclusion within the Pre-Trial Order of a section
for "MATTERS FOUND AND/OR RESOLVED BY THE COURT5'5 and require TA to
include a clear'statement of its alleged damages. (R. 24656, pp. 94-95.) One of the
"matters found" or "resolved by the Court" included in the Pre-Trial Order was the trial
court's legal conclusion that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City
to deny further phases based upon incomplete public improvements.'" (R. 21874, ^f 32
(quoting R. 14351).)
TA included in the Pre-Trial Order a statement of its alleged damages, which
made clear that all of its alleged damages depended upon the ability to develop additional
lots in further phases of Overlake. (R. 21909.) Specifically, TA demanded as damages
the value of the culinary water that the City agreed in the Development Agreement to
provide for TA "at build out,"6 which TA calculated by multiplying the alleged value of
the water per lot by "the number of lots to be sold in the development (the absorption
rate)."7 (R. 21909.) The number of lots to be sold depended upon TA obtaining approval
from the City for new phases. (R. 22244-45.) Thus, if the trier of fact found that: (a) TA
failed to complete the public improvements; (b) the City had not waived its rights to
claim that TA failed to complete the public improvements; and (c) the City should not be
5

R. 21864; 24656, pp. 63-65, 71-72.

6

Ex. 100, pp. 8, §V.I.A-C.

7

TA disclosed the same calculation in response to the trial court's December 8,
2008 discovery order. (R. 23134-35, 23138-41.)
6
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estopped from claiming that TA failed to complete such improvements, then, as a matter
of law, TA could not recover any of its alleged damages.
The City relied upon TA's alleged damages calculations and presented its case at
trial accordingly. Because TA's disclosures established that TA's alleged damages
depended upon the ability to develop further phases, and because the trial court had
established that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny
n

further phases based upon incomplete improvements," one of the City's primary areas of
focus during the trial was proving that TA breached the Bond Agreements by failing to
complete the improvements and defeating TA's estoppel and waiver defenses. (See, e.g.,
R. 24337, pp. 1447-77; 24340, pp. 2130-44; Photo. Exs. 693, 699, 669, 622.)
From June 3 to June 19, 2009, a trial was held on those and other issues. (R.
21746,22315.) A jury was empanelled to resolve the factual issues pertaining to all
claims, except for the parties' estoppel contentions, which the trial court reserved. (R.
24267.)
The night before closing arguments, the trial court held a jury instruction and
special verdict form conference. (R. 24341, pp. 2665-2726.) One of the jury instructions
that the City offered set forth TA's judicial admissions from its pleadings9 and some of
the matters found or resolved by the trial court, including that "[t]he Bond Agreements
8

R. 21874,1j 32 (quoting R. at 14351).

9

The trial court had previously adopted TA's argument that TA's pleading
allegations are judicial admissions, even if the allegations were made in a pleading that
was superseded by a pleading amendment. (R. 10741 n.l.)
#278521 vl sic
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vest authority in Tooele City to deny further phases based upon incomplete public
improvements." (R. 22104.) TA objected to the entire instruction, and the trial court
refused to give it, on the ground that TA did not then stipulate to it. (R. 24341, pp. 267275.)
The next day, the jury was tasked to fill out a Special Verdict Form ("SVF"),
which the parties and the trial court prepared the night before, and the morning of,
closing arguments. (R. 22161-68; 24341, pp. 2726-71; 24342, pp. 2815-28.) A copy of
the SVF is attached hereto as Exhibit A. As filled out by the jury, the SVF established,
among other things, that TA breached the Bond Agreements by failing to complete the
public improvements and that the City did not waive its rights to claim such noncompletion. (R. 22166-67.)
Having prevailed on the factual issues necessary to invoke the law of the case that
"'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny further phases based
upon incomplete public improvements,'"10 and because TA had not asked the trial court
to decide its estoppel claims, the City moved for entry of judgment on August 7, 2009.
(R. 22490-22501.) On September 9, 2009, TA filed an opposition to the City's motion,
along with a motion asking the trial court to rule that the City was estopped from
claiming that the public improvements were incomplete. (R. 22566, 22634.) On October
29, 2009, TA filed its own motion for entry of judgment. (R. 22923-25.)

R. 21874,132 (quoting R. 14351).
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On June 16, 2010, the trial court denied TA's estoppel motion, and on August 18,
2010, it dismissed with prejudice TA's estoppel claims and defenses. (R. 24313-27,
24621-23.)
The trial court struggled with the cross-motions for entry of judgment. After the
two motions were fully briefed, oral argument was held on January 22, 2010. (R. 23008.)
At the end of the hearing, the trial court expressed difficulty harmonizing the SVF, and it
requested further briefing. (R. 23008, pp. 133-34.) After the parties had submitted the
requested briefing, lengthy hearings were held on February 4, 2010 and April 19, 2010.
(R. 23110, 23295.) Ultimately, the trial court could not reconcile the SVF, and it struck
the jury verdict and ordered a new trial. (R. 24308-09.) The inconsistency that the trial
court was unable to reconcile was between the jury's answers to Questions 3 and 8,
which provided:
3.
Has Tooele Associates proven that Toole City waived its claims and
its defenses, as stated in Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially
breached the Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreements?
YES:

X

NO:

8.
Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its rights to
claim that Tooele Associates did not complete public improvements in
Overlake required by the Development Agreement and the Bond
Agreements?
YES:

NO:

X

(R. 22615-16, 24304.)
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B.

Statement Of Facts.
1.

The City Shared TA's Vision For Overtake And Trusted TA To
Properly Construct The Required Improvements.

The City and TA's relationship began in 1995, two years before the Development
Agreement. In 1995, TA and the City entered into an Annexation Agreement, under
which the City agreed to annex most of TA's property, which was located in
unincorporated Tooele County. (Ex. 210.) Most of the benefits that TA argues the City
received under the Development Agreement - land for a new sewer plant, 636 acre feet
of water rights, a golf course, park land, etc., were TA's consideration for annexation of
its property under the Annexation Agreement. (Id.) The additional consideration that TA
gave under the Development Agreement primarily was TA's promise to develop a
community that exceeded the quality of development elsewhere in the City - a different
kind of development that was master planned with enhanced amenities and public
improvements, a mix of lot sizes and housing styles that adhered to architectural and
landscape standards, a championship golf course irrigated with recycled water, public
schools wisely located, and many parks. (E.g., Ex. 100, §§ III.D, F; V.2.A.; VI.2.D;
VII.2.B.; X.2.A., B.; XI.2.A., B.; 24333, pp. 176-82.)
After the City adopted TA's vision for Overlake, the parties seemed to work
together. From 1996 until 2001, TA developed several subdivision phases, including
Phases 1A, IB, 1C, ID, IE, 1G, and 1J. (Exs. 192-199, 276, 301-02.)
TA's obligation to construct public improvements was governed by two Bond
Agreements, one in 1996 for Phases 1A and IB and one in 2001 for Phase U, and four

10
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amendments to the 1996 Bond Agreement to cover Phases 1C, ID, IE, and 1G. (Exs.
220, 267, 268, 282, 293, 449.) The Bond Agreements required that TA's construction of
public improvements conform to the engineering plans and specifications, which TA's
own engineers prepared; they imposed a time limit for all public improvement
construction - one year for Phase 1J and two years for all other phases; and they
precluded any change to the plans unless evidenced by a written change order. (R.
22246; 22268; Exs. 220 § 6, 273, 302B, 303-06, 425, 449 § 6; 24334, pp. 600-01; 24335,
pp. 763, 765-66; 24339, pp. 1941-43.) There was no written change order relieving TA
from completing any of the numerous incomplete public improvements identified at trial.
(R. 24340, pp. 2160-61, 2168, 2172-73, 2179, 2183, 2192-94.) The jury was specifically
instructed that City employees lacked authority to alter, or relieve TA from, the
requirements of the Bond Agreements. (R. 22266.)
For all phases except Phase 1 J, TA's construction obligations were ultimately
secured by a deed of trust, recorded on August 23, 2001. (Exs. 1023, 355 at TC067015.)
TA had persuaded the City to reconvey an earlier trust deed in exchange for the August
23, 2001 deed, but TA neglected to mention that the August 23, 2001 trust deed was
junior to two other trust deeds, securing $4,900,000 of debt. (R. Ex. 355 at TC06701415; 24339, pp. 1927-29.) The City was unaware of the situation until 2007, when it
commissioned a title report to check TA's assertion that the City was "fully secured." (R.
Ex. 355 at TC066885, TC066973.) After the City raised the concern to TA, TA did
nothing to collateralize its public improvement obligations, such as try to subordinate the
senior deeds or provide a substitute bond, and TA's joint venture partner, Perry Homes,
11

#278521 vl sic

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Inc., refused to do so as well.11 (Exs. 355 at 5, 356 at 2-3; 24338, p. 1643; 24339, pp.
2006-07.) The senior encumbrances, together with the City's preference to try to get TA
to finish the improvements itself, is why the City did not initiate foreclosure proceedings.
(R. 24339, pp. 1944-45.) TA's argument in this appeal that the first and second position
deeds "were implied to have been paid down or off is untrue and is not supported by the
record pages TA cites. (TA's Brf. 17 n.19 (citing R. 24339, pp. 1965-73).)
Because TA appeared to be working to complete its public improvements and had
declared no contrary intent, the City approved additional subdivision plats and issued
building and occupancy permits in phases before all improvements were completed,
which allowed TA to sell lots and generate revenue. (R. 24339, pp. 1944-45, 2007-08;
Ex. 323.) And because the City had issued building and occupancy permits, it had to
make municipal services available for the safety and well-being of those going to and
from the building sites and, ultimately, the occupants of the permitted homes. No one
believed that the approval of additional plats, issuance of building and occupancy
permits, and the provision of municipal services that necessarily followed the issuance of
such permits indicated that TA's public improvements were complete or somehow
relieved TA from properly finishing them. (R. 24333, p. 288; 24335, pp. 775-76, 800-01;
24339, pp. 2025-26; 24340, pp. 2298-99.)
11

A Perry Homes, Inc. witness admitted that Perry Homes never offered to replace
TA's worthless security. (R. 24341, p. 2589.) He went on to say that he "didn't know
the City really had that big of an issue with the bond until this trial," but that testimony
was belied by his own acknowledgement, during a November 14, 2007 Planning
Commission meeting, that"[t]he City has responded that the bonds are insufficient."
(Ex. 356 at 3.)
12
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2.

Overwhelmed By Growth Throughout Tooele City, The City Relied
On TA's Engineers At Forsgren To Conduct The Public
Improvement Inspections In Overlake.

Perhaps most illustrative of how the City perceived its relationship with TA was
the City's reliance on TA's engineers with Forsgren Associates, Inc. ("Forsgren") to
ensure that the public improvements were properly completed in Phases 1A, IB, and 1C.
In the latter half of the 1990's, the City was inundated with development, and it lacked
the resources to conduct public improvement inspections in Overlake. (R. 24339, pp.
2036-40; Ex. 113.) For that reason, the City relied on the inspections that Forsgren was
conducting for TA during the construction of Phases 1A, IB, and 1C. (Ex. 113; 24333,
pp. 245, 261, 280; 24339, pp. 2036-37.) City inspectors only occasionally visited
Overlake construction sites, and only to "go over what they had completed," not to ensure
that all required public improvements were finished.12 (R. 24339, pp. 2023-25, 2036-37;
24340, pp. 2201-03; 24341, pp. 2600, 2605.)
Forsgren was undoubtedly acting for and on behalf of TA during these
inspections. (Exs. 113, 248; 24337, pp. 1514-15; 24335, pp. 762-63; 24337, pp. 1514-15;
24339, pp. 2019, 2044-45; 24340, pp. 2146-50.) Forsgren's letter that "memorialized"
and "confirmed]" the inspection arrangement provided: "This letter is to inform the City
that Forsgren Associates has been retained by Tooele Associates to provide construction
inspection services for all Overlake projects." (R. 24341, pp. 2646-47; Ex. 113

i *y

TA was told that if an inspector misses something, TA still has to install it. (R.
24339, p. 2025.) In any event, the jury was instructed that City inspectors lacked
authority to alter the requirements of the Bond Agreements. (R. 22266.)
#278521 vl sic
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(emphasis added).) Forsgren's contract for inspections was with TA, not the City, and
TApaid for them. (R. 24335, pp. 762-63; 24337, pp. 1487, 1514-15.)
The City's reliance on Forsgren was the sole reason that the former City
Engineer/Public Works Director, Gerald Webster, agreed on January 13, 1998, to "accept
on behalf of Tooele City the wet utilities, roadway surface and curb and gutter in Phase
IB Overlake Development."13 (R. Ex. 123; 24339, pp. 2017-18.) Reliance on Forsgren
also was the reason for the statements regarding Phases IB and 1C in City Assistant
Attorney Curt Morris' letters and the bond amount reductions.14 (R. 24339, p. 1944;
24341, pp. 2451-53.)
3.

TA Suffered Financial Difficulties, Which Caused TA To, Initially,
Delay Completing Improvements.

Not long into the project, TA ran into financial difficulties so acute that they
became paralyzing in July, 2001, causing TA to halt development. (R. 24333, pp. 37678, 479, 500-01, 538-39; 24335, pp. 780-81; 24337, pp. 1393-1402; 24339, pp. 2057,
2059-60; 24341, pp. 2490-95; Exs. 417, 424, 429, 452, 601, 804, 858.) As a result, TA
delayed the completion of improvements that the City did not require TA to finish prior
TA asserts that Mr. Webster's signature on the letter means that Mr. Webster
"certified" that the Phase IB improvements were complete. TA's assertion is untrue.
The only certification was provided by Forsgren. (R. 24339, pp. 2017-18, 2036-37; Ex.
123.) In any event, the jury was instructed that only the City Council had the authority to
do what Mr. Webster purported to - accept public improvements - and that Mr. Webster
lacked authority to alter, or relieve TA from, TA's Bond Agreement requirements. (R.
22224; 22246; 22263; 22266.)
14

Under City ordinances, bond reductions in no way preclude the City from
requiring completion of improvements later found to be incomplete. (R. 24333, pp. 26465; 24339, pp. 1944; 24341, pp. 2452-54.) Reducing the bond amount was simply an
accommodation to TA to free up a portion of its collateral. (R. 24340, pp. 2300-01.)
14
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to the issuance of building and occupancy permits. (R. 24335, pp. 775-76, 800-01;
24339, pp. 2025-26.) For example, TA decided to "[d]efer to Spring," 1998 the 400 West
improvements that TA was required to complete in Phase IB. (R. Ex. 238; 24334, pp.
604-06.) In a February 16, 1998 document (two months after Forsgren certified that the
Phase IB improvements were complete), TA listed $232,065 in "400 West Phase IB
Items to Complete," as well as another $209,730 in other "IB items to Complete." (Ex.
249; 24334, pp. 608-09.)
The time TA planned to complete 400 West per the approved construction plans,
however, continually slipped, until TA decided not to complete 400 West at all. In
January, 1999, TA listed as "1999 Activities" "8. Pave 400 W from 2000 N to
DiMaggio" - the segment of 400 West in Phase IB - and "9. Landscape 400 W from
2000N to South end of 1C." (Ex. 273.) TA did not finish 400 West in 1999, so, in
January, 2001, TA asked his partners for $325,000 for "Infrastructure 400 West" to be
done in 2002. (Ex. 438 at Ex. A.) TA's partners never provided funds to finish 400
West, and it was never completed. (R. 24339, pp. 2069-70; 24340 pp. 2140-43, 2151-52,
2162.)
TA had not finished other streets in Overlake to the extent required by the
approved construction plans either, and it left other required improvements incomplete as
well.15 In Phases ID and IE, TA left the eastern one-third of Berra Blvd. incomplete.

15

In Phase IE, TA failed to enlarge the temporary storm water detention facility,
so that it now has only half of its required capacity. (R. 24340, p. 2193.) In Phase 1G,
TA failed to construct sidewalk around multi-family lots. (Id. p. 2179-81.) TA also
failed to install required landscaping, street lights, reflector signs, ADA comer ramps,
#278521 vl sic
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(R. 24340, pp. 2168-69, 2173.) The Phase ID and IE construction plans clearly required
full completion, and the City denied TA's request during Phase ID construction to only
partially build Berra Blvd. (Id pp. 2170-72, 2177-78; Exs. 277-78, 281.) The City
repeatedly reminded TA of the requirement to finish Berra Blvd. in "real time"16 during
TA's Phase ID and IE construction. (Exs. 431, 439; 24340, pp. 2177-78; 24339, pp.
2055, 2066-69; Ex. 405.)
With respect to Phase 1 J, TA promised to finish the south side of 2000 North
when the hospital to the north finished its side of 2000 North. (R. 24337, p. 320; Exs.
415-46.) The hospital completed its side of 2000 North in 2004, but TA refused to
complete the south side.17 (R. 24340, pp. 2187-90.)
4.

TA Assured The City That It Would Finish The Improvements,
Including 400 West Berra Blvd., And 2000 North, As Part Of
Phases IB, 1C, ID, I K A n d l J .

Prior to Phase ID construction, the City stopped relying on Forsgren for
inspections because the City discovered that Forsgren was allowing TA and its
street monuments, decorative bollards, street signs, storm drain pipe, storm drain boxes,
storm drain box tops, sewer/storm drain collars, concrete collars around manholes and
valves, and hydrants, and TA left valves buried in asphalt so that they could only be
found with a metal detector. (Id pp. 2183, 2193-94; 24337, pp. 1459-60, 1464; Exs. 685,
308-13.)
16

TA's Brf. 49.

17

TA asserts that the City obtained State of Utah road funds by claiming it owned
the roads, which, TA argues, could only happen if the City accepted them as complete.
(TA's Brf. at 50.) Although the City did obtain road funds, eligibility for such funds was
not dependent upon road improvements being completed or accepted. (R. 24335, pp.
796-97; 24339, pp. 1945-47; Ex. 1027; 24340, pp. 2302-03.) In any event, the trial court
instructed the jury that City employees, including those who prepared and signed the road
fund requests, lacked authority to alter TA's Bond Agreement requirements. (R. 22266.)
16
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contractors to cut comers. (R. 24340, pp. 2148-50; Ex. 248.) The City realized that TA's
public improvements in Phases 1A, IB, and 1C were not complete, as Forsgren had
certified. (R. 24340, pp. 2013-14, 2035; Ex. 447.) The evidence overwhelmingly proved
that the City made TA aware of the issue, long before this lawsuit.
TA's former Vice President testified that, during her employment with TA
between 1998 and 2001, City officials indicated to TA that 400 West in Phases IB and
1C and Berra Blvd. in Phases ID and IE should be completed to full width. (R. 24339,
pp. 2055, 2066.) During a May 9, 2000 "Summit Meeting" between the City and TA,
one of the "specific problems" that the City identified was "[fjinish both sides of
ROAD," which was a reference to Berra Blvd. (Id. 2067-69; Ex. 405.) City witnesses
likewise testified that the City had raised the non-completion of 400 West and other roads
by May, 2000. (R. 24340, pp. 2170-72, 2177-79; 24339, pp. 2013-14, 2035; Ex. 471.)
In response to the City's complaints about TA's public improvements, TA
acknowledged the requirement to complete the roads as part of the existing phases (not
with future phases), and it agreed to finish the improvements "one phase at a time." (R.
24340, pp. 2205-07, 2283-85; 24341, pp. 2456-57; 24339, pp. 2018-19; Exs. 456, 471.)
Between May, 2000, and June 2002, TA appeared to follow through on its
promises to complete its improvement construction "one phase at a time." (Ex. 456.) TA
completed Phase 1A, reported such completion during a September 18, 2001 meeting
with the City, and about two weeks later, the City accepted the Phase 1A public
improvements. (R. Exs. 117-18; 24340, pp. 2205-07.) During the September 18, 2001
meeting, TA's managing general partner Drew Hall said that "they are going to work on
17
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IE next." (R. Ex. 456.) On June 6, 2002, TA wrote to the City about scheduling final
inspections for Phases IB, 1C, ID, and IE. (R. Ex. 475; 24334, pp. 614-15.) Based on
TA's assurances and reported progress, the City approved the subdivision plat for Phase
U. (R. 24339, pp. 2007-08; Exs. 301, 323.)
5.

Just Before Filing This Lawsuit Against The City, TA Declared That
It Was "At War" With The City, And TA Stopped Working On
Public Improvements And Started Working On Excuses For Not
Completing Them.

In June, 2002, TA stopped all efforts to compete public improvements. Shortly
after sending the June 6, 2002 letter regarding final inspections for Phases IB through IE,
TA's Drew Hall met with the City Engineer, Paul Hansen, and told him that TA was "at
war" with the City. (R. 24340, pp. 2207-08; 24339, pp. 2007-08.)
Instead of working on public improvements, TA began to contrive excuses for
why it should not have to complete them. All of TA's excuses lack credibility.
According to TA's former Vice President, the "real reason Tooele Associates didn't
finish those streets" was "[tjhere was no money to build the roads." (R. 24339, pp. 206970.)
6.

Financial Troubles Caused TA To Not Only Cut Corners On Public
Improvements, But Withhold Payment For Irrigation Water.

Under the Development Agreement, TA was required to pay for water used to
irrigate the Overlake golf course. (Ex. 105, § 8.) TA failed and refused to pay amounts
due since December 18, 2006, despite its receipt of the City's invoices and monthly
statements. (R. 24340, pp. 2360-62; Ex. 800.) TA insisted that it did not need to pay for
the water it used because the invoices lacked meter readings, which, TA argued, was
18
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required under the Development Agreement. (R. 24333, pp. 212-13, 219-21.) In all the
evidence regarding the water charges, TA presented nothing that indicated or inferred
that the City waived its claim that TA materially breached the Development Agreement
by failing to pay amounts owed for golf course irrigation water. (Id pp. 206-21; R.
24339, p. 2029; 24340, pp. 2353-74; Exs. 100, 102,104, 541-42, 545-56, 661, 687.) TA
never even claimed such waiver. (R. 21845-54.)
In the SVF, the jury found that the City proved that TA materially breached the
Development Agreement "[b]y failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the
Overlake Golf Course pursuant to Section 8 of Amendment #4 to the Development
Agreement." (R. 22164-65, Quest. 2.e.) In response to the next question, however, the
jury inexplicably found that the City waived such breach. (R. 22165.)
7.

TA's Development Failed Because Of TA's Financial Distress.

According to TA's correspondence with property tax authorities and its limited
partners, TA's development failed because of its financial distress, not because of
anything the City did. (R. 24334, pp. 480-85, 487-91, 500-06; Exs. 424, 438, 441, 45253, 455, 462-63, 487, 496, 600-01.) TA was severely undercapitalized for the
development it undertook, and its overhead and debt service expenses prevented TA from
ever realizing any profits. (R. 24341, pp. 2469-72, 2477-78.) The only capital
contribution ever made by TA's partners was for less than half the purchase price of the
property in 1994. (Exs. 487, 804.) Every other dollar TA spent was borrowed from
lenders. (Ex. 804.) As a result of TA's debt load, its interest expense was 1,400%
greater than what TA projected. (Ex. 857.) TA's overhead expenses also exceeded
19
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budget, by 1,700%. (Id.) On top of its crushing debt load and overhead expenses, the
residential real estate market suffered a serious, three-year decline beginning in 2000.
(Ex. 1003.) TA quickly found itself in financial crisis, and in July, 2001, TA's partners
halted the project. (Ex. 452.) Thereafter, TA sold off all but 55 acres of its remaining,
undeveloped property to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC, a shell holding company with
only $4,070 in total assets. (R. 24334, pp. 565-66, 571-72, 576-77; Ex. 634.)
8.

Lacking Property To Develop, TA Shifted Its Focus To Blaming The
City For The Failure Of Its Development Project.

After TA had practically no more property to develop, TA shifted its focus to
blaming the City for the failures caused by TA's financial distress and the poor economy.
A prime example is TA's claim that the City adopted a "slow-growth" policy by
proposing an ordinance limiting its culinary water commitments to Overlake. (TA's Brf.
12.) What actually happened is that the City reaffirmed its culinary water commitment to
TA, but required other developers to provide water rights for their developments, an
action which, TA boasted, gave TA "close to a monopoly for residential growth in Tooele
City." (Ex. 250 at 2.)
Another example is TA's assertion that the City was motivated to deprive TA of
its Development Agreement benefits because the City lacked culinary water for Overlake.
(TA's Brf. 12-13.) According to the testimony of TA's own water rights expert,
however, the City had been "very active" in acquiring water rights in order to
accommodate growth. (R. 24336, p. 1059.) TA presented no evidence that the City was
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in any way concerned about providing culinary water for Overlake. (R. 24339, pp. 184344.)
Finally, TA alleges a list of grievances, such as tardiness, to try to prove that TA
faced "conflict and antagonism from the City" in all of its dealings with the City after
1999. (TA's Brf. 13.) Actually, the City made extraordinary accommodations for TA
that other developers did not enjoy. (R. 24339, pp. 1910-12, 1927-29, 1944, 2036-37;
24340, pp. 2136-38, 2243-44, 2298-99, 2300-02; 24340, pp. 2357, 2361; Exs. 101, 105,
113, 405, 456, 483.) TA's portrayal of conflict and antagonism is belied by TA's May,
2000 public assertion that "Tooele is now on the leading edge, and many municipalities
are looking to us as an example of what to do right." (Ex. 407; R. 24334, pp. 526-27.)
The public improvement requirements imposed on TA were not "ever-changing";
they were those in TA's own construction plans, and most of the construction
deficiencies that the City raised were also identified by TA's own engineers at Forsgren.
(R. 24334, pp. 528-901, 607-08, 611-14; 24337, pp. 1424, 1449-50, 1455-61, 1464,
1466-71; 24340, pp. 2138-43, 2151-52, 2162-64, 2168-70, 2173-74, 2179-86, 2192-94;
Exs. 157, 281, 447, 611, 624, 685.) TA's own engineer witnesses testified that the City
cannot be expected to generate a "complete 'punch list'" when the construction has yet to
be completed. (R. 24337, pp. 1473-75, 1522.) With respect to alleged "disparate
treatment," there was no development project in the City with as egregious public
improvement deficiencies as Overlake,18 and the City's request for master planning

18
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documents, which was first made in 1996, was commensurate with the impact of
Overlake and its 7,500 anticipated lots.19 (R. 24340, pp. 2234-35.) TA bemoans the
City's processing time for requests, but the amount of time taken was attributable in most
cases to delays on TA's side. (R. at 24339, pp. 1921-24; 24340, pp. 2235-36; Ex. 355 at
TC066890-94.) The fact of the matter is that TA's financial distress and the sour
economy caused TA's partners to decide to halt further development in July, 2001, and
from then on, TA spent its time posturing rather than developing. (Ex. 452.)
VII.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.
The trial court should have entered judgment in the City's favor. The SVF can be

interpreted as follows:
(1)
The City breached the Development Agreement in certain respects,
but not by refusing to accept as complete TA's public improvements and by
creating "arbitrary and incomplete punch lists for the public improvements"
(Quest. 1);
(2) TA also materially breached the Development Agreement, but the
City waived its material breach defenses to TA's Development Agreement
claims (Quest. 2 and 3);
(3)
5);

The jury proceeded to calculate TA's alleged damages (Quest. 4 and

(4)
TA breached the Bond Agreements, by not completing public
improvements, and the Development Agreement, by not paying for
secondary water used for golf course irrigation, and such breaches were
The City requested only the master planning documents that TA's engineers at
Forsgren had already prepared in 1998, after Forsgren convinced TA that "[t]he
importance of undertaking these planning efforts right now is to make sure that what is
installed now will accommodate future development without having to tear up streets and
install additional facilities." (Ex. 665 at 3, 5.) The City shared these concerns and simply
wanted to review the master planning documents already prepared to assure itself that
future development would not require streets to be torn up. (R. 24340, pp. 2231-35.).
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substantial enough to cause $1.82 million in damages ($1.75 million on the
public improvement deficiencies, and $70,000 in secondary water taken
without payment) (Quest. 6-7, 9-13); and
(5) The City did not waive its rights to claim that TA failed to complete
the public improvements as required by the Bond Agreements. (Quest. 8.)
(R. 22162-67.) The trial court should have applied to thesefindings,and its dismissal of
TA's estoppel claims, the law of the case that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest
authority in the City to deny further phases based upon incomplete public
improvements.'" (R. 21874 ^ 32 (quoting R. 14351).) Because of all TA's alleged
damages depended on the ability to develop additional lots in further phases, there is no
legal basis for TA's recovery of any damages.
The trial court was right to reject TA's interpretation of the SVF. TA's
interpretation is untenable. It conflicts with the plain language of the SVF and
controlling Utah law, and Utah R. Civ. P. 49(b) does not support it. In the alternative, if
this Court is inclined to adopt TA's interpretation of the SVF, other grounds exist to
affirm the trial court's decision striking the jury verdict and ordering a new trial.
Specifically, the jury's findings that the City waived TA's failure to pay for golf course
irrigation water lacks evidentiary support; the jury's finding that the City breached the
Development Agreement by refusing to consent to assignments lacks evidentiary support
and is contrary to law; and the jury's findings of TA's alleged damages are excessive.
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VIII. ARGUMENT.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENTERED JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF THE CITY.

Under Utah law, the trial court is required to apply the law to the facts found in a
special verdict form and enter judgment accordingly. Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(a); Dishinger
v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209,ffi[16-17,47 P.3d 76; Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n,
470 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1970).
In this case, the City was entitled to judgment in its favor, on the following
grounds: (a) the law of the case that '"the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in
the City to deny further phases based upon incomplete public improvements'"20; (b) the
jury's finding that TA "breached the Bond Agreements and Bond Agreement
amendments by failing to complete public improvements in Overlake"21; (c) the jury's
finding that TA failed to prove that the City waived its rights to claim that TA did not
complete the public improvements ; (d) the trial court's rejection of TA's estoppel
claims23; and (e) TA's damages statement in the Pre-Trial Order, which made clear that
TA's alleged damages depended upon the ability to develop additional lots in further
phases.24 (R. 21909.)

20

R. 21874132 (quoting R. 14351).

21

R. 22166 Quest. 6.

22

Id Quest. 8.

23

R. 24313-27, 24621-23.

24

As TA itself argued to the trial court,
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The trial court refused to enter judgment because it found the jury's answers to
SVF Questions 3 and 8 to be irreconcilably inconsistent. Those answers are reconcilable,
and the reasons the trial court concluded otherwise are incorrect.
h

By Their Plain Terms, The Answers to Questions 3 And 8 Are
Consistent.

As TA concedes, "[t]he first step in the harmonization analysis is to consider the
plain language of the Verdict." (TA's Brf. 21.) Taken together, the plain language of
Questions 3 and 8 and the answers thereto mean that the City waived its claims and
defenses under either the Development Agreement or the Bond Agreements, but not both.
The Court may adopt this interpretation on any one of the five, following grounds.
a.

Question 3's Use Of The Term "And/Or" And The Answer
To Question 8 Indicate That The City Did Not Waive Its
Claims Under Both The Development Agreement And The
Bond Agreements.

Question 3 asked whether the City waived certain claims under "the Development
Agreement and/or Bond Agreements," whereas Question 8 asked whether the City
waived certain claims under "the Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements."
(Emphasis added.) The disjunctive or conjunctive nature of a jury question is important.
"The pretrial order controls the issues of the case where it is made without
objection and no motion is made to change it, unless it is modified at the
trial to prevent manifest injustice." Citizens Cas. Co. of New York v.
Hackett, 410 P.2d 767, 768 (Utah 1966). "[T]he pretrial order is treated as
superseding the pleadings and establishing the issues to be considered at
trial." . . . Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1522. Accordingly,
"claims, issues, defenses, or theories of damages not included in the pretrial
order are waived even if they appeared in the complaint.. .." Wilson v.
Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2002).
R. 23255.
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Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1979); Perry v.
Stewart Title Co.. 756 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1985). In this case, it can be used to
readily harmonize the answers to Questions 3 and 8.
Unlike the word "and," which "is most often considered to create a conjunctive
condition/9 the expression "and/of is "used as a function word to indicate that words
are to be taken together or individually[; e.g.,] men and/or women means men and
women or men or women." Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged 80 (1986) (first emphasis added).26
Because the jury could have understood the term "and/or" to mean "or/5 there is
no conflict between the answers to Questions 3 and 8. Although Question 8 asked
whether the City waived certain of its claims under "the Development Agreement and the
Bond Agreements," to which the jury answered "no/' Question 3 may be read to have
asked whether the City waived certain claims under the Development Agreement or the
Bond Agreements. Interpreting the term "and/or" to mean "or" reconciles the conflict
between Questions 3 and 8, so that is the interpretation that must be adopted. Wright v.

25

Parrv. Stubbs, 2005 UT App 310, IT 8. 117 P.3d 1079.

26

See also Bank Building & Equip. Corp. v. Georgia State Bank, 209 S.E.2d 82,
84 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (citations omitted) ("'[T]he expression "and or" is equivocal and
is neither positively conjunctive nor positively disjunctive....'"); State Ins. Fund v.
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 205 P.2d 245, 246-47 (Utah 1949) (holding that an order
requiring "'Merchants Police and/or Intermountain Service Bureau, Inc.'" to pay an
injured employee's expenses did not indicate which entity must pay); Putnam v.
Industrial Comm'n, 14 P.2d 973, 983 (Utah 1932) ('"When [the term "and/or" is] used in
a contract, the intention is that the one word or the other may be taken accordingly as the
one or the other will best effect the purpose of the parties . . . ." (Citation omitted)).
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Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 9A C. Wright & A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2510 (1995) ("It is the duty of the district
court to attempt to harmonize the jury's answers, if at all possible under a fair reading of
the responses."). Under this interpretation, the jury's response to Question 3 means that
the City waived certain of its claims under either the Development Agreement or the
Bond Agreements, but not both.
That leads to the question: which claims were waived, Development Agreement
claims or Bond Agreement claims? Resolution of this question is unimportant, as the
outcome is the same either way. If the City only waived certain Development Agreement
claims, then TA's Bond Agreement breaches would allow the City to deny further
phases, and TA would not be entitled to recover any alleged damages. If the City only
waived the Bond Agreement claims, then TA still would not be able to recover any of
those alleged damages because TA's material Development Agreement breaches, as
found by the jury in response to Question 2, excuse the City's liability to TA under the
Development Agreement.
As demonstrated below, however, important portions of Question 3 indicate that
the jury intended to find that the City waived only material breach claims under the
Development Agreement. Question 3 was limited to the inquiry of whether the City
waived the claims "as stated in Question 2," and Question 2 was devoted solely to
Development Agreement claims. In addition, Question 3 was limited to the inquiry of
whether the City waived "material[]" breach claims, and the City's "material[]" breach
claims set forth in the SVF were limited to claims under the Development Agreement.
27
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Furthermore, all the jury instructions dealing with materiality of breaches identified only
the Development Agreement, not the Bond Agreements. (R. 22204, 22265.) Thus, all
indications are that the jury intended to find that the City waived claims for material
breach of the Development Agreement and not claims for breach of the Bond
Agreements.
b.

Question 3 Was Limited By The Phrase "as stated in
Question 2."

Question 3 asked, "Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its
claims and its defenses, as stated in Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially
breached the Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreements?" (Emphasis added.)
The claims and defenses stated in Question 2 were confined to claims and defenses under
the Development Agreement. Specifically, Question 2 asked, "Has Tooele City proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele Associates materially breached the
Development Agreement?" (Emphasis added.) Similarly, sub-parts a.-f. of Question 2
dealt with the City's individual material breach allegations, all of which were expressly
predicated on specific provisions of "the Development Agreement." (Emphasis added.)
Question 2 made absolutely no mention of Bond Agreements, let alone the City's Bond
Agreement right to deny further phases based upon incomplete public improvements.
Because Question 3 was limited by the phrase "as stated in Question 2"; because
Question 2 had nothing to do with the Bond Agreements; and because Question 3's use
of the term "and/or" means that the jury's answer to Question 3 does not necessarily
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mean anything about the Bond Agreements, the jury's "yes" answer to Question 3 had no
effect on the City's ability to invoke the Bond Agreements.
TA tries to explain away the phrase "as stated in Question 2" by arguing that
either Question 2 referenced "the actual actions described in the subparts to Question 2,"
rather than ways in which TA allegedly breached the Development Agreement, or the
references in Question 2 to "the Development Agreement" encompassed both the
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements. (TA's Brf. 32-33.) TA's argument
is a serious distortion of the SVF. A "plain language" harmonization analysis does not
involve the subtraction or addition of language. Moszer v. Witt, 622 N.W.2d 223, ^ 9,
19 (N.D. 2001); Olson v. Alexandria Indep. School Dist. #206, 680 N.W.2d 583, 587
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
Question 2 plainly asks whether TA materially breached "the Development
Agreement"; it asks "how [TA] breached the Development Agreement"; and each and
every one of its sub-questions references one or more specific sections of "the
Development Agreement." It does not "go[] far beyond the Development Agreement in
addressing the various wrongful actions o f TA,27 and the Bond Agreements are nowhere
mentioned. In fact, during oral argument on how to reconcile the SVF, TA repeatedly
argued that Question 2 dealt only with the Development Agreement: "Question 2 doesn't
have any discussion of the Bond Agreements. Question 2 only discusses the

TA's Brf. 32.
29
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Development Agreement. Duh." (R. 23110, pp. 24, 27.) TA's argument impermissibly
adds and subtracts words from Question 2.
c.

Question 3 Was Limited By The Term "Materially"

Another important qualification in Question 3 is the term "materially55: "Has
Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its claims and its defenses, as stated in
Question 2, that Tooele Associates materially breached the Development Agreement
and/or Bond Agreements." (Emphasis added.) The importance of the word "materially"
in Question 3 is demonstrated by a comparison of the responses to Question 3 and
Question 8. Question 8 made a similar, more detailed inquiry, except it omitted the word
"materially": "Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its rights to claim
that Tooele Associates did not complete public improvements in Overlake required by the
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements?" Although the jury answered "yes"
to Question 3, it answered "no" to Question 8, indicating that the jury found that the City
waived certain "material[]" breach claims, but not breach claims.
The "material breach" concept was important in the context of Section I of the
Special Verdict Form, but not in the context of Section II. During oral argument on how
to harmonize the SVF, TA conceded that "the word 'material' . . . relates to the
Development Agreement and not the Bond Agreement." (R. 23008, p. 41.) As explained
to the jury, the "materiality" of TA's Development Agreement breaches would excuse the
City's further performance of, and effectively terminate, the Development Agreement.
(R. 22265.) But the City never sought to excuse its performance of, or terminate, the
Bond Agreements. On the contrary, throughout this case the City invoked the Bond
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Agreement provisions that "'vest authority in the City to deny further phases based upon
incomplete public improvements.'" (R. 21874, Tf 32 (quoting R. 14351).) Furthermore,
TA did not try to excuse its performance under the Bond Agreements by claiming that the
City breached those agreements. Because no party claimed that its performance under
the Bond Agreements was excused by the other side's non-performance, the "materiality"
of Bond Agreement breaches was irrelevant.
Contrary to TA's argument, the separate doctrine of "substantial performance"
also had no bearing on the City's Bond Agreement claims, unlike the parties'
Development Agreement claims. Under the Development Agreement, TA's "substantial
performance" was an issue because TA could qualify for a ten-year extension of the
Development Agreement "if the terms of the [that] Agreement have been substantially
complied with." (Ex. 100. § XXIII (emphasis added).) In contrast, the Bond Agreement
provisions that vest authority in the City to deny further phases are triggered by any nonperformance, not just "substantial" or "material" non-performance. (R. Ex. 220 §§1.3
and 18, Ex. 449 §§1.3 and 18). Under Utah law, the doctrine of substantial performance
is inapplicable to a contract that does not consider "substantial performance" to be
sufficient.28 Therefore, under controlling Utah law, the "substantial" or "non-substantial"
nature of TA's Bond Agreement breaches is irrelevant.
28

Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1369 (Utah 1993)
("The contract between the parties does not consider substantial completion; rather, it
considers final completion," so "the doctrine of substantial performance does not apply to
the facts of this case."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. d (1981) ("If,
therefore, the agreement makes full performance a condition, substantial performance is
not sufficient.").
31
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The irrelevance of the "material" or "substantial" nature of TA's Bond Agreement
breaches is supported by the jury instructions on the "material breach" and "substantial
performance" concepts. All of those instructions related only to the Development
Agreement, not the Bond Agreements. (R. 22204, 22209, 22265.) It is presumed that
juries do not base their findings on legal concepts outside the jury instructions. Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798 (1986); De Feliciano v. De Jesus, 873 F.2d 447, 451
(1 st Cir. 1989); Olson v. City of Austin, 386 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
Delzer v. United Bank of Bismark, 527 N.W.2d 650, 655-56 (N.D. 1995). Because the
jury instructions limited the concepts of "material breach" and "substantial performance"
to the Development Agreement, those concepts have no bearing on TA's Bond
Agreement breaches.
If, as TA argues, it could have satisfied the Bond Agreements with "substantial"
rather than full performance, or if a "material breach" of the Bond Agreements was
necessary for the City to invoke its Bond Agreement right to deny new phases, TA
waived those arguments. "If. . . the court omits [from the special verdict form] any issue
of fact raised by the pleadings or the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by
jury of the issue so omitted...." Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a). TA did not ask for any SVF
question as to whether TA's Bond Agreement breaches were "substantial" or "material."
In the SVF section that deals with "The City's Claims"—Section II—the jury was asked
to determine whether TA "breached the Bond Agreement and Bond Agreement
amendments by failing to complete public improvements in Overtake," and nowhere was
the jury asked to determine whether the breaches were "material," "non-material,"
32
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"substantial" or "non-substantial." Thus, the nature of TA's Bond Agreement breaches is
irrelevant because the Bond Agreements "do[] not consider substantial completion,"
and because TA never asked for a jury determination of whether its Bond Agreement
breaches were "substantial" or "material."
d.

-

If Question 3 Cannot Be Reconciled With Question 8, It Must
Give Way To Question 8.

One of the available interpretive guides is the rule that "general findings in the
nature of conclusions, if contradicted by special or detailed findings, cannot prevail, but
are controlled by and must yield to such detailed findings of ultimate facts." Knape v.
Livingston Oil Co., 392 P.2d 842, 845 (Kan. 1964); Wright, 787 P.2d at 516 (citing
Knape with approval and holding that "where . . . two [findings] cannot be reconciled, as
in this case, the more specific finding must govern the outcome"). Between Questions 3
and 8, Question 8 is the more detailed and specific finding, as TA conceded. (R. 23110,
p. 29.) Question 8 deals with just the City's public improvement claims under the
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements, whereas Question 3 deals with the
City's "claims and its defenses, as stated in Question 2, that [TA] materially breached the
Development Agreement and/or Bond Agreements." Thus, Question 8 is more specific
and, accordingly, Question 8 and the answer thereto are controlling.

Reliance Ins. Co., 858 P.2d at 1369.
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e.

Any Inconsistency Between Questions 3 And 8 May Be
Resolved By Disregarding The Answer To Question 3, Which
Lacks Evidentiary Support.

"A judge may dissipate the inconsistency by setting aside one of the conflicting
verdicts, if the verdict was unsupported by the evidence." American Cas. Co. v.
Cianciolo, 987 F.2d 1302, 1305 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Orwick v. Belshan, 231 N.W.2d
90, 94-95 (Minn. 1975). Any fair and reasonable basis on which to reconcile verdicts is
preferable to a new trial, and one such basis is the court's authority to grant judgment as a
mater of law notwithstanding the verdict when the verdict lacks evidentiary support.
American Cas. Co., 987 F.2d at 1305; Orwick, 231 N.W.2d at 94.
Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co., 335 P.2d 619, 622 (Utah 1959), supports this
approach. In that slip and fall action, the jury in a special verdict found plaintiff and
defendant both negligent; that defendant's negligence proximately caused plaintiffs fall;
that plaintiffs negligence was not the proximate cause of the fall; and the amount that
would fairly compensate the plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment in the defendant's
favor, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing, in part, that the special verdict answers were
inconsistent, requiring a new trial. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs
argument on the grounds that "there was no substantial evidence, nor was there any
evidence to support the [negative] answer to" the question asking whether plaintiffs
negligence was a proximate cause of his fall. Id 622. Therefore, the Court changed the
answer to the question, which, when combined with other answers and applied to the old
law of contributory negligence, required a judgment for defendant.
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In this case, the answer to Question 3 lacks evidentiary support. Question 3 asked
whether TA proved that the City waived its claims and defenses, "as stated in Question
2," and the jury answered, "yes." One of the claims and defenses in Question 2 on which
the jury sided with the City was the City's claim that TA materially breached the
Development Agreement "[b]y failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the
Overtake Golf Course pursuant to Section 8 of Amendment #4 to the Development
Agreement." There was absolutely no evidence, however, that indicated or inferred that
the City waived such breach. Accordingly, to resolve any inconsistency between
Questions 3 and 8, the answer to Question 3 should be changed to "no."
2.

For Incorrect Reasons, The Trial Court Concluded That The
Answers to Questions 3 And 8 Are Irreconcilably Inconsistent.

According to the trial court's analysis, the City's interpretation of the SVF was
"the most persuasive of the arguments by the parties to the Court to harmonize the jury's
findings in the SVF." (R. 24304.) In other words, the trial court agreed that if any party
was right in its interpretation of the SVF, it was the City.
Nevertheless, the trial court refused to adopt the City's interpretation for four
reasons, all of which were incorrect. First, the trial court misconstrued the answers to
Questions 1(e), (f), and (g) to mean that the City "actively interfered" with TA's ability to
complete the public improvements. (Id.) Second, the trial court found that the "practical
effect" of the City's harmonization of the SVF conflicted with the answers to Question
1(c) and (i), which indicated that the City breached the Development Agreement by
refusing to extend the Development Agreement and by refusing to approve additional
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phases. Third, the trial court suggested that the jury could not distinguish the public
improvement obligations of the Bond Agreements from those of the Development
Agreement. Finally, the trial court was troubled with the "legal and financial
consequences" of the City's interpretation. (R. 24308.)
a.

The Jury Did Not Find That The City "Actively Interfered"
With TA's Public Improvement Construction.

The notion that jury findings suggest that the City interfered with TA's ability to
complete the public improvements in accordance with TA's own plans is flat wrong. A
jury finding should not be "stretched" to a question "it does not touch" upon. Taylor v.
Murray, 232 P.2d 367, 371 (Utah 1951). None of the jury's SVF answers indicate that
the City somehow prevented TA from completing the public improvements to the extent
shown in TA's own construction plans.
Indeed, such notion is negated by the jury's SVF answers to Questions 6 and 10
and Instructions 33 and 44, which the jury must be presumed to have followed. Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 869 (Utah 1981). Under Instruction 33,
TA would be "excused from performing11 the Bond Agreements ,f[i]f you decide that
Tooele Associates was willing and able to perform its obligation, but that it could not
perform that obligation because of something that the other party purposefully did or
failed to do." (R. 22207 (emphasis added).) The jury's finding in response to Question 6
that TA breached the Bond Agreements by failing to complete the public improvements
indicates either that TA was not "willing" to complete the improvements or the City did
not "purposefully" prevent TA from completing them. None of the SVF answers
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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suggests a jury determination that both TA was "willing" to complete the improvements
according to its own construction plans and the City "purposefully" prevented TA from
completing them.
A finding that the City actively interfered with TA's public improvement
construction also conflicts with Instruction 44. Instruction 44 was the mitigation and
avoidance instruction, which precluded the City from prevailing on any breach of
contract claim that "it could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation" or
that it "made worse by its own action or inaction." (R. 22215.) Because the jury must be
presumed to have followed this instruction, its findings that TA breached the Bond
Agreements causing the City $1.75 million in damages indicates that the jury rejected the
notions: (a) that the City "could have avoided [TA's public improvement breaches]
without undue risk [or] burden"; and (b) that the City "made [TA's public improvement
non-performance] worse by its own action or inaction." (Id.) In other words, the jury's
"yes" answer to Question 6 means that the jury rejected the idea that the City actively
interfered with TA's ability to complete the public improvements to the extent shown in
TA's own construction plans. If the jury believed that the City actively interfered with
TA's public improvement work, it simply could not have followed Instructions 33 and 44
and found that TA breached the Bond Agreements, causing the City $1.75 million in
damages.
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b.

The Application Of The Law Of The Case, That The Bond
Agreements Entitle The City To Deny New Phases, Has
Nothing To Do With Whether The SVF Is Irreconcilably
Inconsistent.

The trial court found that the "practical effect" of the City's interpretation of the
SVF - the City's successful invocation of the law of the case - conflicts with the jury's
finding that the City breached the Development Agreement by refusing to approve
applications for the creation of new subdivisions in Overlake and refusing to extend the
Development Agreement for a second ten-year term. The City's invocation of the law of
the case, however, has nothing to do with whether the SVF answers themselves are
inconsistent. As TA concedes, the applicability of the City's Bond Agreement right to
on

deny new phases based upon incomplete improvements was not before the jury ; it was a
matter of law for the trial court to apply upon factual findings of incomplete public
improvements, non-waiver, and no estoppel.
Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, 47 P.3d 76, is squarely on point.
Dishinger was a landlord/tenant dispute over the amount of rent due during lease renewal
option periods. The landlord contended it was $30/square foot, and the tenant asserted it
was $19/square foot, which the tenant paid, and the landlord accepted, for a year. The
jury's special verdict answers and the undisputed facts satisfied each essential element of
the tenant's legal theory that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction for rent at the
$19 rate. Idfflj20-21, 23, 27. The special verdict, however, went on to determine the
appropriate rent amount - $25/square foot - and that the landlord was "entitled to
30
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recover" the balance of base rent, totaling $8,730. Id. f 7. Invoking the law of accord
and satisfaction, the tenant moved for entry of judgment in its favor. The trial court
denied the tenant's motion and instead entered judgment for the landlord for unlawful
detainer, awarding $8,730. Id fflf 8-9.
On appeal, this Court reversed and held that judgment should be entered for the
tenant. Id, ^f 40. In doing so, this Court rejected the argument, adopted by the trial court
in this case, that the "practical effect" of the application of the law conflicted with the
jury's finding of the appropriate rent amount:
Although it could be argued that the special verdict supports inconsistent
legal theories (accord and satisfaction and unlawful detainer), the
inconsistency is not fatal. The jury was instructed to answer all factual
questions on all legal theories presented in the special verdict. While the
findings support inconsistent claims, a court is not precluded, under Rule
49(a), from applying the law to those findings and entering judgment for a
party on one theory, as a matter of law, which precludes judgment on
another inconsistent legal theory.
Thus, as was the case here, if the special verdict findings support, as a
matter of law, an accord and satisfaction then there cannot be an unlawful
detainer.
W, 130 (citations omitted) (citing Milligan, 335 P.2d at 622; Tsudek v. Target Stores,
Inc., 414 N.W.2d 466, 469-70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)). In other words, inconsistency
between the application of legal principles and jury findings is not an inconsistency that
requires a new trial. Applied to this case, Dishinger means that, if the SVF findings
support, as a matter of law, the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new phases, then
the City could not have been required to approve new phases.
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The same principle was applied in Judd ex rel Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT
91, % 34, 103 P.3d 135, in which the inconsistency between a jury's damagesfindingsand
the "practical effect" of a statutory damages cap caused no irreconcilable conflict. The
principle also was applied in Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 397-98
(Utah 1970), and Milligan, 335 P.2d at 622, where juries in special verdicts concluded
that the plaintiffs were contributorily negligent; and, even though contributory negligence
was a complete defense, that the defendants were negligent and such negligence caused
the plaintiffs quantified amounts of damages. No irreconcilable conflict arose from the
inconsistency between, on the one hand, the findings of the defendants' negligence and
the plaintiffs' damages and, on the other hand, the "practical effect" of applying the bar
o 1

of contributory negligence to the findings that the plaintiffs were negligent.
The trial court's ruling, as a matter of law, that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed,
vest authority in the City to deny further phases based on incomplete improvements'" is
akin to the law of accord and satisfaction applied in Dishinger, the statutory damages cap
31

See also Davis v. West Cmty. Hosp., 755 F.2d 455 (5m Cir. 1985) (jury finding
that allegedly libelous statements were true, when applied to law that truth is a complete
defense to libel, required court to enter judgment for defendants, despite jury findings
that defendants made libelous statements, with malice, that caused damages and
warranted punitive damages); Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d 303, 305-06, 310 (7th Cir. 1992)
(jury finding that defendant police officer did not plant evidence, when applied to law of
qualified immunity, required court to enter judgment for defendant officer, even though
jury found for plaintiff on her claim for arrest without probable cause); MacBride v.
Pishvaian, 937 A.2d 233, 238 (Md. 2007) (jury finding of when plaintiffs deceptive
trade practices claim accrued, when applied to statute of limitations, required judgment
for defendant, despite jury findings that defendant's were liable for deceptive trade
practices).
32

R. 21874, f 32 (quoting R. 14351).
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applied in Judd, and the old law of contributory negligence applied in Brigham and
Milligan. The application of the law in those cases caused no special verdict findings to
conflict with one another, and nor does the application of the law of the case in the
present matter.

*•

Thus, the finding that the City breached the Development Agreement by refusing
to approve new phases or renew the Development Agreement raises no "fatal"
inconsistency. Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209, ^ 30. "The [jury's] answer to an
immaterial question or one that can be resolved as a matter of law may be disregarded."
9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2513 (1995);
Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc. v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 434 F.2d 840, 843 (2d
Cir. 1970). Otherwise, the jury could effectively nullify the trial court's legal
determination that "'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny
further phases based upon incomplete improvements.'" (R. 21874, ^f 32 (quoting R.
14351).)
c.

The Jury Could Distinguish Between The Bond Agreements'
And The Development Agreements' Respective Public
Improvement Requirements.

The trial court found it "difficult... to have any confidence that the jury was able
to distinguish between" the public improvement requirements of the Development
Agreement and the Bond Agreements. (R. 24306.) Distinguishing between related
contracts, however, was precisely how this Court reconciled special verdict answers in
Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 300 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The same
is possible in this case. Considering the evidence and the instructions, the jury might
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have concluded that TA's Bond Agreement duties predated, and were more onerous than,
TA's Development Agreement duties, and that the City waived the Development
Agreement's public improvement duties, but not the Bond Agreement's duties.
The Bond Agreements predated the Development Agreement. The first Bond
Agreement, which governed Phases 1A, IB, 1C, ID, IE, and 1G, was entered into on
October 3, 1996 (Ex. 220), whereas the Development Agreement was entered into over a
year later, on December 18, 1997. (Ex. 100.)
Moreover, the Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements differ in their
respective public improvement requirements. The Development Agreement required TA
to complete "sufficient and necessary" right-of-way improvements "in compliance with
the requirements of the City, in effect at the time of all preliminary and final subdivision
plats and all site plans." (Ex. 100, §§ III.G., VII.2.E., XVII.) TA tried to prove at trial
that the "necessary" improvements were installed, they were "sufficient," and the
"requirements of the City" did not include, for example, full-width completion of streets.
(TA's Brf. 14 n.13.) TA also presented evidence that, if the City believed that the
"necessary" improvements were not installed "sufficiently]," the City could have
prevented the public from using them, and the City's decision not to do so amounted to
waiver. (R. 24337, pp. 1478-80.)
By contrast, the Bond Agreements were not satisfied with the construction of
merely "necessary" or "sufficient" improvements. Unlike the Development Agreement,
the Bond Agreements unambiguously incorporated TA's construction plans and
identified the improvements in those plans as the improvements TA was required to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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construct.

The Bond Agreements also required the improvements to be completed

within one or two years, depending on the phase. In addition, the plans incorporated into
the Bond Agreements each required written change orders for any deviations from the
plans. (Exs. 302A, 302B, 303-06, and 425 at Gen. Note 1.) That requirement made it
more difficult for TA to prove waiver of a Bond Agreement duty than a Development
Agreement duty. Because the jury could have found that the Bond Agreements'
requirements differed from the Development Agreement's duties, it could have found that
the City waived the Development Agreement public improvement requirements but not
the Bond Agreement requirements.
TA argues that "there is no basis for a distinction between the requirements of the
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreement^]" because the answer to SVF
Question 1(h) means that "neither [the Development Agreement nor the Bond
Agreements] provided TA with the standards necessary to "complete" the public
improvements." (TA's Brf. 29.) Although TA is correct that the Development
Agreement did not incorporate the construction plans, that is not true with respect to the
Bond Agreements, and Question 1(h) does not support TA's argument. Question 1(h)
asked whether the City breached the Development Agreement
[b]y requiring [TA] to complete public improvements to standards that are
not found within the Development Agreement, the approved construction

33

In support of its argument that "[b]oth agreements required construction of
public improvements illustrated on the same documents," TA cites only the trial court's
memorandum decision challenged on appeal, which obviously could not have been a
basis on which the jury reached its findings. (TA's Brf. 28 (citing R. 24305-06).)
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drawings, the Bond Agreements or the City's ordinances and/or that are not
required by other similarly situated developers.
(R. 22163.) Clearly, what the answer to Question 1(h) means is that either the City
required TA to complete public improvements to standards in addition to those found
within any one or more of the listed sources, or that the City did not require other
developers to comply with the same standards imposed upon TA. It does not mean that
the construction plans were outside the Bond Agreements. Indeed, during oral argument
on how the SVF may be reconciled, TA admitted, "remember that the Bond Agreements
incorporate by reference the construction drawings." (R. 23295, p. 21.)
TA included in the Pre-Trial Order its position that "[a] breach of the Bond
Agreements or Bond Agreement Amendments may not be considered a breach of the
Development Agreement and a breach of the Development Agreement may not be
considered a breach of the Bond Agreement." (R. 21856, n.5.) In keeping with that
position, TA elicited testimony that the Bond Agreements for Phases 1A and IB predated
the Development Agreement and were excluded from the Development Agreement by
virtue of the Development Agreement's integration clause. (R. 24339, pp. 1954-56, Ex.
100, § XXI.) TA also pointed out that additions to the Development Agreement must be
signed by the City's mayor after approval by the City Council, and there was no evidence
of City Council approval of any of the Bond Agreements or Bond Agreement
amendments, and some of the amendments lacked the mayor's signature. (R. 24339, pp.
1954-55; Ex. 100 § XXI.) Thus, the jury was presented with conflicting views on
whether the Bond Agreements were incorporated into the Development Agreement; it
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was never instructed to adopt one view over the other; so it was free to adopt TA's view
that "[a] breach of the Bond Agreements or Bond Agreement Amendments may not be
considered a breach of the Development Agreement." (R. 21856, n.5.)
d.

The "Legal And Financial Consequences" Of "The Most
Persuasive" SVF Interpretation Are Irrelevant.

The trial court resisted the City's interpretation because the result "carries too
much of legal and financial consequences." (R. 24308.) Under Utah law, such
consequences are entirely irrelevant to either the harmonization analysis or the
application of legal principles to jury findings. The legal and financial consequences of
reconciling jury findings and applying legal principles were simply not factors in Judd ex.
rel Montgomery v. Drezga, Dishinger v. Potter, Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n,
Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co., and Wright v. Westside Nursery, despite the fact that
the outcomes of those decisions undoubtedly resulted in significant legal and financial
consequences for the parties.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO ENTER
JUDGMENT IN TA'S FAVOR.

Although the trial court erred by declining to enter judgment in the City's favor, it
was correct to deny TA's motion for entry of judgment. TA's interpretation of the SVF
is untenable. It conflicts with the plain language of the SVF and controlling Utah law,
and Utah R. Civ. P. 49(b) does not support it. In the alternative, if this Court is inclined
to adopt TA's interpretation of the SVF, other grounds exist to affirm the trial court's
decision striking the jury verdict and ordering a new trial.
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1.

TA's Interpretation Of The SVF Is Untenable.

In addition to supporting some of the trial court's reasons for not adopting the
City's interpretation, TA contends that "waiver of claims of breach of both [the
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements] is a viable option." (TA's Brf. 37.)
TA argues that, unlike Question 3, Question 8 is "silent 'as far as breach'" and "only
ask[s] whether the City waived its right to recover the costs to complete the public
improvements," which, TA argues, is "the difference between substantial performance
and complete performance." (TA's Brf. 22.) "[T]he key," TA says, is Instruction 35 on
"substantial performance." (Id. at 24.) TA's interpretation fails for at least any one of
the following five reasons.
a.

TA's Interpretation Ignores The Plain Language Of Questions
2 And 3.

Any interpretation that concludes that the City waived both its Bond Agreement
claims and its Development Agreement claims cannot be squared with the plain terms of
Questions 2, 3 and 8 and the answers thereto. TA's interpretation requires the Court to
either disregard the phrase "as stated in Question 2," or torture the language in Question 2
to exclude the references to "the Development Agreement" or add references to the Bond
Agreements. An interpretation that requires the Court to add or subtract terms is not
tenable.
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b.

TA's Interpretation Does Not Reconcile The Answers To
Questions 3 And 8.

TA argues that Questions 3 and 8 are consistent because, unlike Question 3,
Question 8 was "silent 'as far as breach'" and "only ask[ed] whether the City waived its
right to recover the costs to complete the public improvements." (TA's Brf. 22.)
TA's interpretation simply does not work. First, Question 8 was not "silent" as to
breach. Question 8 asked whether the City "waived its rights to claim that [TA] did not
complete the public improvements in Overlake." (Emphasis added.) Waiving "rights to
claim" means waiving, inter alia, a claim of breach. If a person waives his "rights to
claim," he may not assert a breach; and, conversely, if a person does not waive "his rights
to claim," he may assert a breach.
TA's argument is internally inconsistent. If Question 8 did not encompass breach
claims, as TA now asserts, then TA is wrong in arguing that Question 8 "only ask[s]
whether the City waived its right "to recover the costs to complete the public
improvements." (TA's Brf. 22.) The right "to recover the costs" depends upon a breach
claim. If Question 8 means that the City preserved its right "to recover" costs, then it
cannot be said that Question 8 is "silent as far as 'breach.'"
Second, TA's argument that Question 8 "only ask[ed] whether the City waived its
right to recover the costs to complete the public improvements" is flat wrong. Question 8
asked whether the City waived "its rights to claim that [TA] did not complete the public
improvements in Overlake required by the Development Agreement and the Bond
Agreements?" To borrow TA's phrase, Question 8 was "silent as far as" "costs to
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complete the public improvements." TA's argument requires the Court to interject a
limitation that the plain language does not support.
The answers to Questions 3 and 8 simply cannot be reconciled on the basis that
Question 3 deals with breach claims and Question 8 does not. The only interpretation
that reconciles these answers is the City's.
c.

"The Key" To TA's Interpretation Are The Legal Concepts
That The Jury Instructions And SVF Confined To The
Development Agreement.

"[T]he key" to TA's interpretation is a jury instruction that, by its terms, has no
application to the Bond Agreements. (Id at 24.) TA relies on Instruction 35 to argue
that, under Questions 3 and 8, the jury found that TA "substantially performed" the Bond
Agreements. TA also relies on Instructions 30 and 63 to argue that its Bond Agreement
breaches were not "material." (Id. at 24, 26.)
The answers to Questions 3 and 8 may not be reconciled based on the application
of the "substantial performance" and "material breach" concepts to the Bond
Agreements, because the jury instructions on those concepts were clear that they related
solely to the Development Agreement. "We must assume that juries follow instructions,
and that they do not 'consider and base their decisions on legal questions with respect to
which they were not charged.'"34 De Feliciano, 873 F.2d at 451 (quoting Heller, 475
U.S. at 798); Olson, 386 N.W.2d at 817; Delzer, 527 N.W.2d at 655-56. The jury was
34

TA itself cites authority for this proposition. (TA's Brf. at 39 n. 36 (citing Carr
v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995).) Cair holds that a jury "verdict will not be
disturbed if the answers can be reconciled under any theory. The theory, however, must
be supported by the trial court's instructions to the jury." 904 P.2d at 503.
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never instructed to consider and base their decisions regarding the Bond Agreements on
the "substantial performance" and "material breach" concepts. According to Instructions
30, 35, and 63, those concepts were confined to the issues surrounding the Development
Agreement.35 In addition, as demonstrated above, TA waived a jury determination as to
whether its Bond Agreement breaches were non-material or non-substantial. Utah R.
Civ. P. 49(a).
d.

TA's Interpretation Depends Upon The Notion That The City
Actively Interfered With TA's Public Improvement
Construction, Which The Jury Rejected.

Throughout TA's interpretation, TA insists that the SVF contains a finding that the
City "actively interfered" with TA's public improvement construction. As demonstrated
above, the jury nowhere indicated that the City somehow prevented TA from following
its own construction plans.
Moreover, far from reconciling SVF answers, TA's "active interference"
argument, if adopted, would create conflict between the answers to Questions 1(e), (f),
(g), and (h), upon which TA's argument is based, and Question 8. In response to
Question 8, the jury found that TA had breached the Bond Agreements by failing to
In any event, the jury's determination of the magnitude of TA's Bond
Agreement breaches indicates that TA's breaches were "substantial." "A party has
substantially performed when 'the only variance from the strict and literal performance
consists of technical or unimportant omissions and defects.'" Reliance Ins. Co., 858 P.2d
at 1370 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1281 (5th ed. 1979)); see also R. 22209. Hence,
a "non-substantial" breach would be a "technical or unimportant" omission or defect.
The jury found that TA's Bond Agreement breaches caused $1.75 million in damages.
Given the magnitude of TA's breaches, they simply cannot be characterized as "technical
or unimportant omissions or defects." Thus, the SVF clearly indicates that TA's Bond
Agreement breaches were "substantial" in nature.

#278521 vl sic

49

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

complete public improvements. As shown above, if the jury believed that the City
"actively interfered" with TA's construction work, the jury would have had to reach the
opposite conclusion, under Instructions 33 and 44. TA's interpretation is not only
untenable, but it just creates more conflicts.
e.

TA's Interpretation Is Premised On The Incorrect Notion
That A Jury May Determine What A Party Is Entitled To
Recover And Nullify Legal Principles That Bar A Recovery.

TA argues that the answers to Questions 3 and 8 are reconcilable because "[b]y
answering 'yes' to Question 3 the Jury found . .. that TA is entitled to recover damages,"
and under Question 8, "the Jury intended the City to be awarded completion damages
under the theory of substantial completion." (TA's Brf. 22 n.23, 26.) TA's argument
fundamentally conflates the roles of judge and jury.
The jury was not asked and, under Utah law, has no authority to determine, what a
party is "entitled to recover." Nowhere in the SVF was the jury asked what each party
was "entitled to recover" or should "be awarded." Instead, the jury was asked to
"[i]dentify the amount of... losses" or "the amount of damages . . . suffered" (R. 2216668.)
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has squarely rejected the idea that "the jury's
right to determine damages extends not only to a factual assessment of their amount, but
also to an actual award of those damages." Judd ex rel. Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT
91,fflf33-34, 103 P.3d 135. Instead, "it is the jury's duty to determine the amount of
damages a plaintiff in fact sustained, but it is up to the court to conform the jury's
findings to applicable law." Id. ^f 34. "'[Although a party has the right to have a jury
50
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assess his damages, he has no right to have a jury dictate through an award the legal
consequences of its assessment.'" Id. ^ 33 (quoting Etheridge v. Med Ct. Hosp., 376
S.E.2d525, 529 (Va. 1989)).
It is the law which gives or withholds an award. . . . Instead of awarding
damages to the plaintiff, the jury merely determined the amount of damages
which he had sustained.
Brigham, 470 P.2d at 397. Under Utah law, the SVF cannot be construed as a
determination of what any party should receive or recover.
2.

The Jury Had No Authority To "Reject[]" The Law Of The Case
That "'The Bond Agreements Do, Indeed, Vest Authority In The
City To Deny Further Phases Based Upon Incomplete Public
Improvements.'"

TA argues that the SVF should be interpreted against the backdrop of the case as
submitted to the jury. What that means, however, is that it must be presumed that the
jury did not consider or base its findings on any legal concepts outside the jury
instructions. Heller, 475 U.S. at 798; De Feliciano, 873 F.2d at 451; Olson, 386 N.W.2d
at 817; Delzer, 527 N.W.2d at 655-56. Because the City's Bond Agreement right to deny
further phases based upon incomplete public improvements was not before the jury, it
must be presumed that the jury did not consider it in any of its findings and, hence, did
not "reject[]" it. (TA's Brf. 52.)
The only way the jury could have rejected the City's Bond Agreement right to
deny further phases based upon incomplete public improvements is if the jury was
authorized to nullify the law of the case. Under controlling Utah law, juries simply have
no such authority. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-103; Judd, 2004 UT 91, ^ 33-34; Brigham,
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470 P.2d at 397-98; Milligan, 335 P.2d at 622-23; Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209,ffif2830. The jury in this action had no more authority to nullify the law of the case than the
jury in Judd had to nullify the statutory cap on medical malpractice recoveries; than the
juries in Brigham and Milligan had to nullify the law of contributory negligence; or than
the jury in Dishinger had to nullify the law of accord and satisfaction.
The City preserved its Bond Agreement right by including it in the Pre-Trial
Order. TA has cited no authority for the proposition that the City was required to do
more to preserve such right, such as in a jury instruction.36 On the contrary, under
Drezga, Brigham, Milligan, and Dishinger, it didn't matter whether or not jury
instructions were given on the legal principles applied to jury findings.
3.

The SVF Was Submitted Under Rule 49(a); It Contains No
General Verdict Under Rule 49(b).

TA argues that the SVF actually contains general verdicts accompanied by special
interrogatories under Utah R. Civ. P. 49(b) and the SVF answers that TA dislikes are
"general verdicts" that should be disregarded in favor of the answers to the "special
interrogatories" found in its favor.37 According to TA, the SVF contains general verdicts
because the SVF asked mixed questions of law and fact, as opposed to just pure questions
36

TA should not be heard to bemoan the absence of a jury instruction with the
City's Bond Agreement right to deny further phases. The City proposed such an
instruction, but TA convinced the trial court not to give it. (R. 22104, 24341, pp. 267275.)
37

TA's argument is ironic considering TA's stipulation to a jury instruction that
provided "[t]his case is not submitted to you for the rendition of a general verdict as is
sometimes done, but it will be your function in this case to make findings as to special
questions which are submitted to you." (R. 22256.)
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of fact, and the jury received instructions on legal concepts to apply to the facts. Under
controlling Utah law, none of that means the SVF contains general verdicts.
TA again incorrectly asserts that "there appears to be no published Utah opinions
on this issue." (TA's Brf. 40.) In Milligan, the Utah Supreme Court held that, even
though the jury answered mixed questions of law and fact, "we have no general verdict
here." 335 P.2d at 622. The verdicts in Brigham and Dishinger were held to be special
verdicts, which made it permissible for the courts to apply legal principles thereto, even
though the verdicts contained answers to mixed questions of law and fact. Brigham, 470
P.2d at 395, 397; Dishinger, 2001 UT App 209,1TC 7.
The SVF contains no general verdicts, even under the authority TA cites. A
general verdict is a verdict "whereby the jury find[s] either for the plaintiff or for the
defendant in general terms." Black's Law Dictionary 1560 (6th ed. 1990); e.g., MUJI
Form 36.6. According to TA's authorities, for a verdict to be a "general verdict," it must
establish the "ultimate legal conclusions" of each or all claims in the case. E.g., Zhang v.
Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Thus in a general verdict
the jury announces only the prevailing party on a particular claim, and may announce
damages.").
TA can identify no SVF answer to any SVF question that establishes the "ultimate
legal conclusion" of any claim. Mixed questions of law and fact are common in special
verdict questions, as "[i]t long has been understood that law and fact are categories that
are not so neatly separated." 9B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2506 (3d ed. 2010). "When
questions of that type are submitted, there must be an accompanying instruction
53
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explaining the legal standards to be applied by the jurors." Id. Thus, mixed questions of
law and fact and jury instructions explaining the legal standards do convert any SVF
answer into a "general verdict."
4.

The Trial Court's Ruling May Be Affirmed On Alternative
Grounds.

This Court may affirm the trial court's decision '"on any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record.'" Lucero v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, 1j 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (quoting
Limb v. Federated Milk Prod. Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969)). In this case,
this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on the grounds that there was insufficient
evidence to support the positive answer to Question 3; the jury's finding that the City
breached the Development Agreement by refusing to consent to assignments of the
Development Agreement was contrary to law and unsupported by evidence; and the
jury's damages findings in SVF Question 5 are excessive.
a.

There Was No Evidence That The City Waived TA's Failure
To Pay For Irrigation Water.

Under Rule 59(a)(6), a new trial may be granted based on "[insufficiency of the
evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law." As
demonstrated above, there was absolutely no evidence presented at trial indicating that
the City waived TA's material breach of the Development Agreement by failing to pay
amounts owed for water used to irrigate the Overlake Golf Course. The jury, however,
found that the City waived such claim in response to Question 3. Because the evidence is
insufficient to justify that finding, the trial court's order for a new trial should be
affirmed.
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b.

The Jury's Finding That The City Breached The
Development Agreement By Refusing To Consent To
Assignments Is Contrary To Law And Unsupported By
Evidence.

TA alleged, and the jury found in Question 1(b), that the City breached the
Development Agreement "[b]y refusing to recognize and accept assignments of the
Development Agreement to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC, Perry Homes, Inc., L.H.
Perry Investments, LLC and Overlake Golf, LLC." (R. 22162.) The City could not have
breached the Development Agreement in that manner because the Development
Agreement did not require the City to provide after-the-fact consent to assignments.
The Development Agreement prohibited assignments "without the prior written
consent of the City, which shall not be unreasonably withheld." (Ex. 100, § XVIII.) TA
asked the City to consent to assignments of the Development Agreement for the first time
on June 13, 2005, and again on September 5, 2006. (Exs. 515-16.) In all TA's evidence
regarding its requests for consent to assignments, it presented no earlier request. (R.
24333 pp.361-69; 24334, pp. 574-76; 24335 pp. 817-43, 898-906, 919-20, 955; 24336 pp.
1012,1035-40; 24338 pp. 1553-56, 1599-1601.) TA judicially admitted, however, that
by June, 2005, it had already assigned the Development Agreement in the manner
reflected in its requests.38 (R. 3765-68,fflf30-31, 34, 36-37, 39-43, and 46; 3823-25, fflf
376-83.) Under Howe v. Professional Manivest Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 163-64 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992), a party cannot be held to have breached a duty to give "prior consent" to

ID

The trial court held that TA was bound by such admissions throughout this case.
(R. 10741 n.l.)
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assignments if the assignments occurred prior to request for consent.

Because the jury's

answer to Question 1(b) was contrary to law and unsupported by evidence, the trial
court's order for a new trial should be affirmed.
c.

The Jury's Calculation Of TA's Alleged Damages Was
Excessive.

In the Pre-Trial Order, TA limited its alleged damages to between $4,764,511.40
and $6,700,124.40. (R. 3829, 21910-12.) At TA's urging, the trial court dismissed with
prejudice "[a]ll claims n o t . . . presented and preserved by the June 11, 2009 Pre-Trial
Order," including "[TA's] claims of damages other than the alleged damages disclosed in
the June 11, 2009 Pre-Trial Order." (R. 24641-43.) The amounts that the jury found to
be TA's alleged damages—$5 million and $17.5 million—greatly exceed the amount that
TA could possibly recover under the Pre-Trial Order and the trial court's order of
dismissal. (R. 22166.)
Furthermore, TA's damages calculation was fundamentally flawed. TA advanced
an expectancy, or benefit-of-the-bargain, measure of damages equivalent to the value of
water per lot, multiplied by the number of lots that TA projected it would develop,
discounted to present value. (R. 21909.) Under Utah law, any expectancy measure of
damages must deduct the costs that the plaintiff avoids by not having to perform its
contractual duties. Ford v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, Tf 39, 98 P.3d
39

"Where a party is contractually bound to follow certain procedures and
timelines in order to invoke specified contractual rights, and the party fails to do so, the
party waives his or her rights." Kenny v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209, f 24, 186 P.3d 989;
Deer Crest Assocs. L LC v. Silver Creek Dev. Group, LLC, 2009 UT App 356, f 9 and
n.3, 222 P.3d 1184.
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15; Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774-75 (Utah 1986). In TA's case, the
costs TA would avoid by not having to perform the Development Agreement include the
costs of developing and constructing the public improvements. (R. 24334, pp. 41, 14344; 24335, pp.201-02.) TA unabashedly deducted none of those costs from its damages
calculation. (R. 21909; 24337, p. 48.) As a result, the jury's finding of TA's alleged
damages are clearly excessive. Accordingly, the trial court's order for a new trial should
be affirmed.
IX.

CONCLUSION.
This Court should reverse the trial court's ruling and direct the trial court to enter

judgment in the City's favor for the amount of the damages that the jury found the City to
have sustained. Otherwise, the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling ordering a new
trial because TA's interpretation of the SVF is untenable or, alternatively, certain jury
findings lack evidentiary support or are contrary to law, and the amounts entered as TA's
alleged damages are excessive.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2011.

George MiJ3aley
/
Christopher R. Hogle
Attorneys for Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, Tooele City Corporation

#278521 vl sic

57

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 9th day of March, 2011, two true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT,
TOOELE CITY was served via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to:
Bruce R. Baird
BRUCE R. BAIRD, P.C.
2150 South 1300 East, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Attorneys for Appellant,
Tooele Associates L.P.
Paxton R. Guymon
Lauren Y. Parry
MILLER GUYMON, P.C.
165 S. Regent Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Appellant,
Tooele Associates L.P.

Q^P-ifti

a?7»*?i

vi

«1P.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
58may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

EXHIBIT A

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FILED DISTKIU COUH
Third Judicial District

M 1 9 2009
deputy Oeif'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TG0fcL£.ASSOClATI:S 1.

)

el al

Plaintiffs,
VS.

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

TOOELE CITY, et al.;
Defendants.
TOOELE CITY;

I
- <l
J

Third-Party Plaintiff.
vs.

i

Civil No. 060919737
Judge Randall Skanchy

w

1
I
I

FORSGRliN ASSOCIATES. INC., et al.;
i" hird-Party Defendants.

)

I
I
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
At least six of the eight of you must agree to the answers to the questions below, but they
need not be the same six on each question. Unless at least six of you agree, you may not return
an answer to any question,
We. the jury, find as follows:
Section I:
I.

Tooele Associates' Claims,

Mas Tooele Associates proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele City
materially breached the Development Agreement, including its implied covenant of good
faith and lair dealing?

YES: j s ,

NO:

*

If you answered "NO" to this Question, DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE
QUESTIONS IN SECTION I. Please skip to Question 6 in Section II.
# If you answered "YES" to this Question, identify how Tooele City breached the
Development Agreement:
By refusing to recognize and accept as complete the public improvements in the
Overlake Project Area subdivisions Overtake Estates Phases IB, IC, ID, IE. IF
or IG?

NO: A

YES:

§,:

NO:

YES
c.
YES

By refusing to recognize and approve assignments of the Development
Agreement to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC, Perry Homes. Inc., 1..H. Perry
Investments, LLC and Overlake GolL LLC?

X

By failing and refusing to extend the term of the Development Agreement
pursuant to Section XXIII of the Development Agreement?

NO:

&
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4.

By creating arbitrary and incomplete punch lists for the public improvements
constructed by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions'?

NO

YES:

4

By slowing or refusing to give final inspections of the public improvements
constructed by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions?
YES:V
YES:
V
f*
E S ^X
YES:
:g.
YES: ¥
:itir

X

YES:

|:-;

YES: "-i*S-

^11
YES:_

NO;
By misinterpreting and misapplying its own public improvement ordinances in
relation to the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions?
NO;
By refusing to recognize and accept its own admissions that public improvements
within the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions were complete?
NO:
By requiring Tooele Associates to complete public improvements to standards
that arc not found vuthiu the Development Agreement, the approved construction
drawings, the Bond Agreements or the Cits "s Ordinances and or thai are not
required of other similarly situated developers?
NO:
By refusing to approve, and threatening refusal of, applications for the creation of
new subdivisions within the Overlake Project Area?
NO;
By finding and asserting that Tooele Associates had materially breached the
Development Agreement?

>4-

NO:_

k.
YES:

By asserting mcritlcss, trivial and frivolous claims against Tooele Associates?

NO:jL

*2$tA$5 v 11 *k
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By failing to commence site design and site improvements within 180 days ol^
Tooele Associates' transfer to the City of land donations provided earlier than
final plat or final site plan approval?
YES: V
^

H

NO:

Has Tooele City proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Tooele Associates
materially breached the Development Agreement?

>: *V
K
YES:

NO;

If you answered "NO" to this Question, skip to Question 4.
If you answered "YES" to this Question, identify how Tooele Associates breached the
Development Agreement:
ii,

YES:

By failing to complete public improvements in Overlake pursuant to Sections
VII.2 and VIII.2 of the Development Agreement?
NO

b.

YES: Y

a

YES:

By failing to comply with the requirements for the approval of subdivision plats
and site plans and all other applicable ordinances, resolutions, policies, and
procedures of Tooele City, pursuant to Sections IILG and XVII of the
Development Agreement?
NO:
By failing to set aside and provide land in Overlake for public uses, including lor
public schools, pursuant to Sections IX.2, X.2. and XE2 of the Development
Agreement?
NO

C

YES:

•*HW*l<tHI;

4-

•x

By assigning portions of the Development Agreement to one or more parties
without the prior written consent of Tooele Cit> pursuant to Section XVIII of the
Development Aizreement?
NO

x

•
m
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YES; V
C

By failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the Overtake Golf
Course pursuant to Section 8 of Amendment &4 to the Development Agreement*?
NO:
By failing to construct a golf course on approximately 258 acres of land in
Overtake pursuant to Section X.B of the Development Agreement?

X

Yes:

No:

1.

Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its claims and its defenses, as
stated in Question 2. that Tooele Associates materially breached the Development
Agreement and/or Bond Agreements?

YES:

h

NO:

If you answered "YES" to this Question, continue on to Question 4.
If you answered "NO" to this Question, DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE
QUESTIONS IN SECTION I. Please skip to Question 6 in Section 11.

4

Has Tooele Associates proven to a reasonable certainty:
the amount of losses Tooele Associates has suffered as a result of Tooele City's
breach of the Development Agreement from 2003 to May 15, 2009?

YES: K

NO;
the amount of losses Tooele Associates will suffer as a result of Tooele City's
breach of the Development Agreement from May 15, 2009. to 2017?

YES: K

NO:

If you answered "YES" to either portion of this Question, continue on to Question 5.
If you answered "NO" to both portions of this Question. DO NOT ANSWER ANY
MORE QUESTIONS IN SECTION I. Please skip to Question 6 in Section II.
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Identify the amount of Tooele Associates' historic and future losses:
&

Historic loss: What losses has Tooele Associates proven that it has suffered as a
result of Tooele City's breach of the Development Agreement from 2003 to Mav
15,2009?

S *Q \ \\s\yt>|M{
fe

(d° not enter any amount if you answered "NO" to Question 4.a)

Future loss: What future losses has Tooele Associates proven that it will suffer as
a result of Tooele City's breach of the Development Agreement from May 15,
2009, to 2017?
o not enter any amount if you answered "NO" to Question 4.b)

H ,<?<£>! ceo
Section II: The City's Claims.
•$<

Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates breached the Bond Agreements and Bond
Agreement amendments by failing to complete public improvements in Overlake?

a,

YES: I

%f

NO:

Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates breached Sections II1.G, VI1.2, VI11.2,
and XVII of the Development Agreement by failing to complete public improvements in
Overlake?

ES:\
YES:

4

*
•

NO:

If you answered "YES" to this Question or Question 6, continue on to Question 8.
If you answered '"NO" to this Question and Question 6, skip to Question 11.

Has Tooele Associates proven that Tooele City waived its rights to claim that Tooele
Associates did not complete public improvements in Overlake required by the
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements?
YES:

•

NO:

^

If you answered "NO" to this Question, continue on to Question 9.
If you answered "YES" to this Question, skip to Question 11.
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Has Tooele City proven to a reasonable certainty the amount ofcosts that it will have to
incur to complete public improvements in Overtake required by the Development
Agreement and the Bond Agreements?

YF-SOi
•
»

NO:

If you answered "YES" to this Question, continue on to Question 10.
If you answered "NO" to this Question, please skip to Question 11,

10.

What is the amount of damages Tooele City suffered, if any, from Tooele Associates'
breach of the Development Agreement or the Bond Agreements based upon Tooele
Associates* failure to complete public improvements in Overtake?

I i,

Has Tooele City proven that Tooele Associates breached Section 8 of Amendment #4 to
the Development Agreement by failing to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate
the Overtake Golf Course?

*
•

12.

If you answered "YKS" to this Question, continue on to Question 12,
If you answered "NO" to this Question. DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE
QUESTIONS. Please have the jury foreperson sign and date this Special Verdict
Form and alert the courtroom deputy that you have arrived at a verdict,

Has Tooele Cit) proven to a reasonable certainty the amounts owed b) Tooele Associates
for water used to irrigate the Overtake Golf Course?

YES:.^
*

NO:.

If you answered "YES" to this Question, continue on to Question 13.

6
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IX

If you answered i; N(T to this Question. DO NOT ANSWER ANY MORE
QUESTIONS. Please have the jury foreperson sign and date this Speeial Verdict
Form and alert the courtroom deputy that you have arrived at a verdict.

What is the amount of damages Tooele City suffered, if any, from Tooele Associates'
failure to pay amounts owed for water used to irrigate the Overlake Golf Course?

% T'.ncD
Please have the jury foreperson sign and date this Speeial Verdict and alert the courtroom
deputy that you have arrived at a verdict.
DATED this J$

day of June, 2009.

/

Foreptfp&n
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